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Michael Hennessy, an assistant professor of history at the Royal Military College of 
Canada, here presents a worthwhile study of the US Marines in the Viet Nam conflict, 
based on a useful bibliography. He focuses on the period of most intense American 
commitment to the war, 1965-71, and on perhaps the conflict's most dangerous area, the 
notorious I Corps, the provinces immediately south of the grotesquely misnamed 
Demilitarized Zone, where the Marines had their concentration. His main purpose is a 
"comparison between thought and deed." The book's principal conclusion is unsurprising 
but significant: " In both theory and practice American strategy failed to adjust to the 
dilemmas posed by the dual conventional and guerrilla threats in Viet Nam." (both from 
the Preface)  
The Marines tried to apply to Viet Nam valuable lessons they had learned in the 
Caribbean and Central America in the 1920s and 1930s. These lessons were distilled in 
the Marines' 1940 Small Wars Manual, which is still a most valuable volume because its 
ideas were both valid and well-understood. In essence, the standard procedure of the 
Marines in those tropical assignments (mainly Nicaragua and Haiti) was to establish an 
enclave and within it to set up and train a local militia. The Marines would eventually 
hand control over to this militia and move on.  
During this conflict in Viet Nam, General Victor Krulak, commander of the Marines in 
the Pacific area, understood that if American forces could provide security to the villages, 
this would deprive the larger enemy units of food, recruits, intelligence and taxes, and 
thus cause them eventually to wither. He also knew that village security has meaning 
only if the security forces will remain in the village. Hence Marines took on more and 
more responsibility for maintaining small units in the villages of I Corps (out of which 
grew the famous Combined Action Platoons- CAPs). The Marines' war became one of 
small skirmishes and counterterrorism, against the will of the Army brass and the US 
Embassy. "Marine Corps commanders found themselves in a constant struggle between 
the common sense of the half-forgotten old doctrine [the 1940 Manual] and the dictates 
of the new Army doctrine." (p. 24)  
Rather than security for the villages - which was where most Vietnamese lived - the 
Johnson administration placed its hopes for diminishing support for the VC success on 
economic development. It was the War on Poverty transferred to Southeast Asia. It 
apparently occurred to few within the Beltway in those days that Vietnamese peasants 
might aid VC because of simple physical fear.  
Hennessy emphasizes, however, that village security could never have been the whole 
war. "No strategy that rested on the assumption that North Viet Nam's role in the war was 
primarily supportive, rather than dominant . . . would likely have succeeded." (p. 182) 
That is, village security efforts needed to be protected from main-force VC and regular 
NVA attacks. General Westmoreland's big-unit war was therefore necessary as a shield 
for pacification. The US Army, however, did not confine its actions to spoiling 
operations; instead it waged the big-unit war as an end in itself, a war of attrition. Given 
the Johnson administration's geographical restrictions on US actions, such a war could 
have relatively little lasting effect except to wear out American opinion at home. But 
increased emphasis on the big-unit war did mean a decreased role for the Marines in 
pacification. By 1971, pacification was at last receiving the attention it deserved, but by 
then the US was preparing to write off South Viet Nam. Thus the 85,000 Marines in 
country in 1969 had fallen to 500 by mid-1971.  
On the eve of the great Tet Offensive, 470,000 US troops were in Viet Nam; of these, 
only 74,000 were in combat-maneuver battalions. Lyndon Johnson, arguably the worst 
war leader in US history, sent an army vast in size but still too small to do the job and 
hedged about with all sorts of political limitations, to pursue questionable tactics in 
support of an inadequate strategy, in a country whose real importance to US security was 
quite unclear, under the scrutiny of sensationalist and increasingly hostile news media 
manipulated by NVA agents.  
That is how it came to pass that by 1972, with nearly one-third of the South Vietnamese 
population participating part time or full time in security forces of one kind or another (p. 
153), with the war having become the conventional type in which US air power would be 
at its most effective, with a stable government in Saigon and every sign indicating that 
the communists did not have the support of anything approaching a majority of the 
population - in these most propitious circumstances of the entire conflict, the US 
abandoned its allies to their fate.  
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